

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 08000 01 OF 03 080734Z

ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PA-01 EB-08
/044 W

-----010653 080826Z /12

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3369

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FOR EA/K RICH FROM GLEYSTEN

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, ECON, MILI, ZN, KS, US

SUBJECT: MABASSADOR'S ADDRESS TO KOREAN/AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

1. FOLLOWING IS MY PROPOSED TEXT FOR MY MAIDEN (BLUSH) SPEECH
IN KOREA ON SEPTEMBER 11 BEFORE THE KOREAN/AMERICAN ASSOC.
I NEED YOUR RAPID CLEARANCE BECAUSE WE MUST TRANSLATE AND
REPRODUCE THE TEXT IN ADVANCE. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE SHORT
NOTICE BUT THE DEPARTMENT'S REQUESTS TO ME ON OTHER MATTERS
ARE THE REASON FOR MY DELAY IN DRAFTING. MOREOVER, I THINK
YOU WILL AGREE I HAVE STAYED WELL WITHIN THE LIMITS:

2. BEGIN QUOTE: TITLE: THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE
UNITED STATES IN EAST ASIA.

3. LET ME BEGIN BY AN IMPRESSIONISTIC SKETCH OF THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF THE EAST ASIAN ENVIRONMENT. FIRST,
THE UNITED STATES IS INESCAPABLY INVOLVED IN EAST ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC. THE REGION PLAYS A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE
WORLD'S BALANCE OF POWER BECAUSE OF ITS ENORMOUS POPULATION,
ITS GEOGRAPHY, ITS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC WEIGHT AS WELL AS
ITS LONG POLITICAL TRADITION. APART FROM THIS WE HAVE MANY
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 08000 01 OF 03 080734Z

OTHER BONDS. JUST TO CITE ONE, OUR TRADE WITH THE AREA IS
LARGER THAN OUR TRADE WITH ALL OF EUROPE. ADMITTEDLY, WE
HAVE HAD PERIODIC DIFFICULTY IN DECIDING ON THE APPROPRIATE
LEVEL OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN EAST ASIA, FOR EXAMPLE, IN CHINA
DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II AND THEN LATER IN VIETNAM. AT
THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE HISTORICAL RECORD CONFIRMS --
AND THERE IS NO BETTER EXAMPLE THAN THE KOREAN WAR -- THAT

WE RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY FOR INVOLVEMENT IN EAST ASIA AND ARE PREPARED TO PAY THE PRICE OF MAINTAINING A STRONG UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA.

4. SECOND, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION VIEWS EAST ASIA WITH OPTIMISM. THERE ARE SOME DARK OR BLACK SPOTS, SUCH AS THE FIGHTING IN INDOCHINA AND THE PLIGHT OF CAMBODIA, BUT FOR THE BULK OF THE PEOPLES IN EAST ASIA CIRCUMSTANCES ARE IMPROVING. EAST ASIA HAS BECOME ONE OF, IF NOT THE MOST, VITAL AND DYNAMIC REGIONS IN THE WORLD.

5. THIRD, WE SEE EAST ASIA AS AN AREA WITH COMPLEX POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS WHICH CONFOUND SIMPLE PREDICTIONS AND CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH THE SITUATION OF THE 1950'S. TO BE SURE, THE SO-CALLED COMMUNIST WORLD WAS NEVER AS MONOLITHIC OR STRONG AS WE FEARED. BUT IT WAS FAR MORE COHESIVE THEN THAN IT IS TODAY. NOW THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIVALRY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA CAUSING BOTH THOSE NATIONS TO DEVOTE DIS-PROPORTIONATE AMOUNTS OF THEIR HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN MILITARY VIGILANCE AGAINST EACH OTHER. THE COUNTRIES OF THE INDOCHINA PENINSULA ARE DIVIDED AMONGST THEMSELVES TO THE POINT OF BRUTAL FIGHTING.

6. IN CONTRAST, NON-COMMUNIST ASIA HAS EVOLVED AND DEVELOPED IN WAYS THAT ARE EXTREMELY REASSURING FOR THOSE WHO WORRIED -- AND THE FACT IS MOST OF US DID -- THAT THESE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 08000 01 OF 03 080734Z

COUNTRIES WOULD COLLAPSE ONE BY ONE FROM A COMBINATION OF INTERNAL WEAKNESS AND EXTERNAL THREAT. INSTEAD WE HAVE SEEN THE GRADUAL EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND RATES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAT HAVE BECOME ONE OF THE WONDERS OF THE WORLDS. MOREOVER, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MATCHED BY NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COHESION, SUCH AS ASEAN, AND A NEW LOOK IN FOREIGN POLICY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GLOBAL INTERESTS OF EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES.

7. FOURTH, OUR ADMINISTRATION ASSUMES THAT THE SITUATION AND TRENDS I HAVE SKETCHED ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE RADICALLY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. TENSIONS AMONG THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES MAY INCREASE OR DECREASE, BUT THERE IS NO FORESEEABLE PROSPECT THAT THESE COUNTRIES WILL UNITE IN A MONOLITHIC BLOCK. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY DISRUPT HOPEFUL TRNDS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES AND THEREBY CONFUSE THE PATTERNS WE SEE TODAY, BUT THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE TEMPORARY ABERRATIONS. THE BASIC INTERESTS AT WORK TODAY IN EAST ASIA CAN BE COUNTED ON TO RE-ASSERT THEMSELVES.

8. IN SUM, WE SEE EAST ASIA IN OPTIMISTIC TERMS, ESPECIALLY

IF WE THINK BACK TO THE NADIR OF OUR DOMESTIC TURMOIL OVER THE WAR IN VIETNAM: WE ALSO SEE IT IN COMPLEX TERMS, ESPECIALLY IF WE LOOK BACK TO THE SIMPLE BLACK AND WHITE CONCEPTS OF THE COLD WAR ERA. OUR POLICIES ARE BASED ON A HARD-HEADED APPRAISAL: NOT ON WISHFUL THINKING. LET ME MENTION THE MOST CENTRAL.

9. OUR SECURITY POLICIES. A STRONG US MILITARY PRESENCE IS THE MOST BASIC OF OUR EAST ASIAN POLICIES. WITHOUT SUCH A PRESENCE, WE WOULD:

--UNDERMINE THE CONFIDENCE OF OUR ALLIES AND LONG-STANDING FRIENDS:

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 08000 01 OF 03 080734Z

--REVERSE THE FUNDAMENTAL BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW POLICIES, SUCH AS OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

--DANGEROUSLY REDUCE THE DETERRENCE AGAINST AGGRESSION IN CERTAIN CRITICAL AREAS, SUCH AS KOREA:

--AND RISK THE DANGER THAT KEY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WOULD RECALCULATE THEIR OPTIONS AND ALTER THEIR BASIC POLICIES IN WAYS HIGHLY ADVERSE TO REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY.

10. BUT A STRONG MILITARY PRESENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE EITHER THAT THE UNITED STATES DO EVERYTHING ITSELF OR REFRAIN FROM ANY CHANGE. THE GROWING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF OR ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS THE ENDING OF OUR CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA PERMIT US TO ADJUST OUR MILITARY PRESENCE TO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 08000 02 OF 03 080810Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3370

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 3 SEOUL 8000

FOR EA/K RICH FROM GLEYSTEN

GROUND FORCES CAN BE MOVED, WHILE OTHER FORCES ARE MAINTAINED, MODERNIZED AND IN SOME CASES INCREASED. THE CENTRAL DEFENSE ROLE IS SHIFTING TO THE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES, LEAVING THE UNITED STATES PRIMARILY WITH THE ROLES OF ASSISTING THE SELF-HELP EFFORTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE AGAINST AGGRESSION, MAINTAINING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND PROVIDING A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. FOR THE UNITED STATES TO FAIL TO ADJUST TO THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT ONLY BE A LESS EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES, BUT WOULD ALSO INVITE UNNECESSARY AND POTENTIALLY DAMAGING CONTROVERSY IN OUR OWN COUNTRY.

11. ALL OF US WILL BE BETTER OFF IF WE CAN ACCOMMODATE OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES TO THE REALITIES -- AND CHANGING REALITIES -- OF EAST ASIA. OUR CURRENT CHINA POLICY HAS, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT ONLY REDUCED THE DANGER OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN MANY PARTS OF EAST ASIA, BUT HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN. AND HOPEFULLY OVER TIME I BELIEVE IT WILL HELP IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. OUR TASK IS TO MAINTAIN A STRONG POLICY WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE SO THAT WE CAN WORK WITH LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 08000 02 OF 03 080810Z

RATHER THAN AGAINST TRENDS IN THE AREA. HARD THROUGH THIS MAY BE, IT IS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE. SUCCESS REQUIRES A COMBINATION OF FIRMNESS AND FLEXIBILITY, OR RESISTANCE AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, OF LOYALTY TOWARD ALLIES AND WILLINGNESS TO EXPERIMENT IN NEW DIRECTIONS. ABOVE ALL, IT REQUIRES A WILLINGNESS TO BE IMAGINATIVE AND FLEXIBLE TO SUIT CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. I THINK THE POLICIES OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAVE MEASURED UP TO THESE STANDARDS AS WE HAVE TRIED TO FIND LESS EXPENSIVE AND LESS DANGEROUS WAYS OF TRYING TO SECURE PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAVE BEEN CORRECT IN SEEKING NEW WAYS TO ARRANGE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

LEADING TO ARRANGEMENTS MORE DURABLE THAN THE CURRENT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS BEEN EQUALLY IMAGINATIVE IN ITS EFFORTS TO RENEW AND DEVELOP THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE -- EVEN THOUGH NORTH KOREA HAS CONTINUED TO REBUFF THESE PROPOSALS AND HAS CONTINUED TO INSIST UNREASONABLY THAT IT REPRESENTS ALL THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

13. OUR ECONOMIC POLICY. MANY NATIONS OF EAST ASIA COULD NOT HAVE SURVIVED WITHOUT OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND AN EVEN LARGER NUMBER COULD NOT HAVE BECOME THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC ENTITIES THEY ARE TODAY WITHOUT AN ENLIGHTENED ECONOMIC POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES. INITIALLY THROUGH AID AND LATER THROUGH PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO AN ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN EAST ASIA WHICH HAS PERMITTED RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A SYSTEM WHICH HAS BROUGHT MUTUAL BENEFIT BETWEEN EXPORTING AND IMPORTING NATIONS AS WELL AS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN MOST OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 08000 02 OF 03 080810Z

THEMSELVES. GONE ARE THE DAYS WHEN AMERICAN CRITICS COULD ALLEGE THAT WE WERE DEVOTING TOO MUCH MONEY FOR TOO LITTLE BENEFIT WITH TOO MUCH OF OUR EFFORT CONCENTRATED IN EAST ASIA. TODAY THE SITUATION IS SO COMPLETELY DIFFERENT THAT SEVERAL EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES ARE EXTENDING ASSISTANCE AND SETTING AN EXAMPLE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

14. THIS SPECTACULAR ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENT HAS DEPENDS CRITICALLY ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND EVEN THOUGH DOMESTIC MARKETS IN EAST ASIA WILL EXPAND MUCH MORE RAPIDLY IN THE FUTURE THAN IN THE PAST, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TRADE WILL REMAIN ENORMOUS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REMAINS A STRONG ADHERENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE TRADE. HOWEVER, THE MOST SUCCESSFUL EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES -- KOREA, JAPAN, AND OTHERS -- WILL HAVE TO ADJUST THEIR OWN ECONOMIC POLICIES TO HELP THE UNITED STATES KEEP ITS DOORS OPEN TO FOREIGN IMPORTS. THESE COUNTRIES WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE EVEN MORE ATTENTION THAN IN THE PAST TO MARKET DIVERSIFICATION, EXTRA PRECAUTION AGAINST SUDDEN GROWTH OF EXPORTS IN SENSITIVE CATEGORIES, AND GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC STRUCTURES WHICH ARE HEAVILY BIASED IN FAVOR OF EXPORTS. IMPORT LIBERALIZATION IN THE EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMIES WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO OFFSET GROWING PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IN THE WORLD'S MAJOR MARKETS.

15. THE DOMESTIC CLIMATES WE SEEK IN EAST ASIA. CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN POLITICAL VALUES AND CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IT IS HARDLY A SECRET THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WISHES -- WITHIN OBVIOUS LIMITS OF

NATIONAL SOVERIGNTY AND PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY -- TO
NOURISH THESE VALUES IN OTHER SOCIETIES. WE DO SO IN
RECOGNITION THAT WE MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH THE INTERNAL
POLITICS OF OTHER NATIONS, AND THAT AMERICANS OFTEN HAVE
AN IMPERFECT UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OTHER PEOPLES WANT AND
HAVE ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED. MANY AMERICANS ALSO KNOW THAT
WE OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES SURPASS US
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PAGE 04 SEOUL 08000 02 OF 03 080810Z

IN MANY ASPECTS OF CIVILIZED SOCIETY. OUR GOVERNMENT WILL
TAKE ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT BUT WE WILL
NEVERTHELESS PURSUE OUR IDEALS.

16. BEFORE CLOSING I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME PERSONAL
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT OUR POLICIES AS THEY SPECIFICALLY AFFECT
KOREA. AS I HAVE SAID ON OTHER OCCASIONS, AND AS SO MANY
KOREANS HAVE POINTED OUT TO ME SINCE MY ARRIVAL, OUR
TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN THROUGH A VERY, VERY BAD PERIOD
WHOSE ONLY VIRTUE HAS BEEN TO PROVE THE UNDERLYING SOLIDARITY
OF THE TIES THAT BIND US. AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF
US WHO WERE NOT IN KOREA, FAILED TO APPRECIATE ADEQUATELY
THE DEGREE OF ANXIETY HERE IN KOREA AND IN MOST OF EAST
ASIA AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE OF OUR POLICY IN VIETNAM.

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 08000 03 OF 03 080810Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3371

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 3 OF 3 SEOUL 8000

FOR EA/K RICH FROM GLEYSTEN

THUS, WE UNDERESTIMATED THE RISK THAT KOREA WOULD MIS-
UNDERSTAND PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICY ON GROUND FORCE
WITHDRAWALS. ANOTHER ISSUE KNOWN TO YOU BUT WHICH I
PREFER NOT TO DISCUSS PUBLICLY HAS PROVOKED PEOPLE'S
PATIENCE, CREATED MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND SOMETIMES LEFT
VERY BRUISED FEELINGS. DESPITE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME
FURTHER DIFFICULTY OVER THIS PROBLEM -- WHICH I STRONGLY
HOPE WE CAN AVOID, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA
SHOULD SOON BE IN A POSITION WHERE WE CAN ASSESS THE DAMAGE
AND COMMENCE THE REPAIRS TO ONE OF THE CLOSEST RELATION-
SHIPS WHICH HAS EVER EXISTED BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES.

17. WITH THIS PROSPECT IN MIND, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT
THE FIRM UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF
KOREA WILL CONTINUE AS WILL MILITARY COMBAT PRESENCE IN
KOREA. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY OF GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWALS
SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN ADJUSTMENT OF OUR MILITARY PRESENCE
TO MEET NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. THE WITHDRAWALS WILL BE GRADUAL
AND CARRIED OUT WITH BOTH CAUTION AND FLEXIBILITY. IF
THE ASSUMPTIONS WE HAVE MADE -- EITHER ABOUT THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA'S CAPACITY FOR SELF-DEFENSE OR ABOUT THE EXTENT
OF DANGER IT FACES -- PROVE WRONG, WE WILL ADJUST OUR PLANS.
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 08000 03 OF 03 080810Z

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CAN ALSO COUNT ON THE UNITED STATES
FOR SUPPORT IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ARENAS. I MIGHT
SAY IN PASSING, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD HELP IF KOREANS
WOULD SHOW MORE CONFIDENCE TOWARDS US WHEN WE SAY THAT
WE WILL NOT LET THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA DOWN.

18. ALONG WITH THESE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE MUST
ADJUST OR MODERZINE OUR RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS
EACH OTHER. GIVEN KOREA'S CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE WORLD WAR
II AND THE SPECIAL ROLE PLAYED GLOBALLY BY THE UNITED
STATES, IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT A PATERNALISTIC
RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED BETWEEN US. BUT THE TIME FOR SUCH
AN UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP HAS PASSED. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
HAS ACHIEVED A DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SELF-RELIANCE
WHERE SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE AND WILL
ONLY CREATE UNNECESSARY CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS.
WE SHOULD INSTEAD SEEK A RELATIONSHIP OF AS MUCH EQUALITY
AS IS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE BETWEEN TWO VERY DIFFERENT
COUNTRIES. LEAVING TO KOREANS THE DECISION ON THEIR
APPROPRIATE ROLE, AMERICANS MUST STOP TAKING KOREA FOR
GRANTED AND STOP TELLING KOREANS HOW TO DO THINGS WHICH THEY
KNOW HOW TO DO FAR BETTER THEMSELVES. I RECOGNIZE THAT I
AM NOT THE FIRST PERSON TO MAKE THIS POINT, BUT I WANT YOU
TO KNOW THAT I WILL WORK TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE.
GLEYSTEN

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SPEECHES, AMBASSADORS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 sep 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978SEOUL08000
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780365-1062
Format: TEL
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780988/aaaacund.tel
Line Count: 385
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1d341054-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1502187
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MABASSADOR'S ADDRESS TO KOREAN/AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
TAGS: PEPR, ECON, MILI, ZN, KS, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1d341054-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014